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1. Introduction 
The New York City off-hour delivery (OHD) program provides an interesting example of multi-stakeholder 
cooperation between public and private sector partners, community advocates, and trade organizations. Large and 
complex, the project required stakeholder collaboration to fully achieve its goals. Begun as a small research project 
in 2002, the original idea was transitioned into practice because of its potential economic and environmental 
impacts. It is estimated that, if fully funded, the program could switch in excess of 20% of the congested day hours 
freight traffic deliveries to the off-hours (between 7PM and 6AM). The impacts would be tremendous: $150-$200 
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million/year in economic benefits associated with travel time savings, productivity increases, and sizable pollution 
reductions (e.g., 20.9% of OHD leads to reductions of: 202.7 metric tons (t) of CO, 40t of HC, 11.8t of NOx, and 
69.9 kg of PM10) (Holguín-Veras, Ozbay, Komhauser, Brom, Iyer, Yushimito et al., 2011b). Recognizing these 
significant impacts, the City of New York adopted OHD as part of its sustainability plan (City of New York, 
2011), and the United States’ Federal Highway Administration decided to create their own program to foster OHD, 
based on the concept pioneered in NYC (Federal Highway Administration, 2012). 
The path to implementation began when the project demonstrated how it could benefit all stakeholders: citizens 
and bicyclists would enjoy enhanced quality of life with less interference from deliveries; the urban economy 
would be improved by lower delivery costs; carriers would benefit from increased productivity; receivers would 
enjoy increased reliability; day-hour travellers would experience faster travel speeds; and with the use of low noise 
truck technologies, local communities would not be impacted by night noise. The research conducted enabled a 
concept design that addressed the needs and concerns of all parties. This gave stakeholders confidence that the 
proponents had thoroughly considered and would have solutions for all key issues. 
While the OHD project is now widely recognized as a success, the road to implementation was not smooth. At 
various stages, potential participants and stakeholders showed lack of interest, scepticism, and even hostility. At 
the outset, the prevailing attitude of most city agencies was that urban freight operations were a private sector 
activity; one that they “should not mess with.” On the private sector side, most carriers were in favour of the 
project because of the lower costs, though they realized that nothing would happen without the approval of 
receivers. Receivers, on the other hand, were content with the status quo (regular-hour deliveries), and saw no need 
to change. The carriers, who stood to benefit, do not generate enough profits from OHD to compensate the 
receivers for their extra costs. Thus, the urban freight system (UFS) was locked in a sub-optimal solution. Without 
public sector incentives to receivers in exchange for their participation in OHD, no change was possible. The lack 
of any history of cooperation between the public and private sectors was another obstacle to change, with 
uncertainty on both sides about whether “the other side” would do what was necessary to jumpstart the program. 
The carriers were unsure of the public sector’s commitment to offering incentives to the receivers, and how long 
lasting that commitment would be. Meanwhile, some in the public sector were unsure whether the incentives 
would have the intended effect, and whether such intervention was even warranted.  
This paper discusses the lessons learned during the OHD project, and the important role cutting-edge research 
can play in defining new paradigms of UFS. It identifies the most effective paths to achieving the desired goals: 
building coalitions of agents-of-change involving both private and public sector partners; pilot-testing as an 
external validation for research concepts; and the importance of defining implementation pathways for  promising 
concepts, while also accounting for the complex political realities of modern urban environments. These lessons 
are framed in the dual contexts of the fundamental tenets that should guide sustainability efforts, and the market 
conditions that influence UFS participants’ behaviour. 
The paper has five sections: Section 2 addresses the tenets that should guide efforts to improve UFS’s social 
performance; Section 3 summarizes the key economic factors that influence UFS behaviour; Section 4 elucidates 
the top lessons learned from the OHD project; and Section 5 considers the question of transferability. The 
Conclusions section synthesizes the paper’s chief findings. 
2. Fundamental Tenets 
This section discusses the chief principles that, in the opinion of the authors, should guide City Logistic efforts. 
Taken together, these tenets provide a solid foundation for research, policies and programs that seek to advance 
UFS sustainability, now and in the future. 
2.1. The importance and behavior change to foster sustainability 
The quest for sustainability is fundamentally one of behaviour change, both short- and long-term. Central to the 
effort is public sector policy, combined with proactive engagement of the private sector, to transform UFS 
operations (the short-term) and the strategic decisions of firms (the long-term), towards increased sustainability, 
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quality of life, economic efficiency, and environmental justice. To achieve this, one needs to: (1) understand 
behaviour; (2) identify appropriate public sector policy measures; (3) identify the roles of the stakeholders in the 
execution of policy, and gain their cooperation; (4) assess the effectiveness of alternative policies; (5) identify 
pathways for implementation that account for the relative positions of the stakeholders; (6) test novel concepts; and 
(7) proceed to implementation, if appropriate.  
To understand the behaviour of UFS agents one must assume that they are rational, guided by a desire to 
maximize their economic returns, given market and regulatory constraints. However, though it is safe to assume 
that an agent’s behaviour and operations are guided by rational considerations, it is also safe to assume that there is 
room for improvement in those operations. Simply put, within the context that an agent operates—their constraints, 
value system, education and training levels, access to technology, and market pressures—they are doing their best. 
By modifying these constraints, and inducing carriers to consider such other aspects as sustainability, freight 
behaviour can be influenced for the better. 
An understanding of behaviour is essential to identify policies to improve the UFS. A lack of understanding—
about the problem and about how the UFS would respond to a proposed policy—can lead to ineffective efforts, 
loss of credibility, and numerous unintended effects. However, in terms of UFS operations—where most decisions 
are private transactions—city officials are often at a complete loss; unaware of how agents interact and how to 
improve the system. In this context, behavioural research helps identify the best means (programs/policies) to the 
desired ends (goals).  
Key considerations in policymaking are the policy instrument to be used, and the strength of the corresponding 
policy stimulus. The combined use of stated preference data and behavioural discrete choice models has proven 
very useful in providing insights, as illustrated in Holguín-Veras, Silas, Polimeni & Cruz (2007), and Holguín-
Veras, Silas, Polimeni & Cruz (2008). For instance, a city agency may decide to use parking pricing to foster a 
better allocation of curb space, which leads to the question of what the parking charge should be. If it is too low, it 
may fail to have any impact; if set too high, it may lead to underutilization of a public good, and significantly, 
probably justified opposition from users. Although city officials could set the charge by trial-and-error, doing so 
may lead to a lack of credibility, as users may perceive this as an indication that the officials do not know what 
they are doing.  
Another important consideration is the policy’s target, which is not trivial or necessarily straightforward, given 
the great heterogeneity in behaviours. In response to a policy measure, it is almost certain that the various industry 
sectors would respond very differently. Knowing in advance which sectors would respond and in what manner, 
could help with the design of differential policies that focus on specific industry segments. For instance, as shown 
in Holguín-Veras, Silas, Polimeni & Cruz (2007), that the receivers of food and retail products were found to be 
more sensitive to financial incentives than other sectors. Thus, it made sense to focus effort in these sectors, as 
opposed to targeting the broad population of receivers that would be less inclined to participate. 
2.2. Policies that foster sustainability have to account for the selfish behavior of all involved 
The politics of implementation and the durability of the public sector intervention must also be considered. A 
beneficial policy that is accepted and embraced by all stakeholders is likely to be better, in the long term, than an 
ideal policy that is bitterly opposed by influential groups. This is important to consider, as the multiplicity of 
agents involved in the UFS provides ample opportunities for change to be blocked or delayed. Such opposition 
could lead to the reversal of the original policy and a setback that could take years to recover from. Thus, 
coordinated efforts involving key stakeholders are bound to be more effective and longer lasting than unilateral 
public sector actions. The clever use of incentives and penalties could play a key role in ensuring that the majority 
of stakeholders benefit, or at least remain unchanged, from the implementation. Achieving this balance can smooth 
the way for implementation, engender political support, and open the door for further collaboration.  
These principles were used very effectively in the OHD project. First, the concept hinged on the voluntary 
participation of companies, a request that conveyed to the private sector the message that city agencies were 
interested in working together, as opposed to acting unilaterally by imposing regulations. This laid a foundation for 
collaboration. Recognizing that receivers would accrue additional costs, the program proposed financial incentives 
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for them, which in turn garnered support from both receivers and their trade groups. Since noise at night could lead 
to significant community opposition, which might also derail implementation, the team adopted a proactive noise 
policy to ensure that the carriers conduct OHD without negatively impacting local communities. The net effect of 
these actions was to facilitate implementation. 
3. Economic Foundations 
This section focuses on the economic aspects considered when designing and implementing programs aimed at 
increasing UFS sustainability. Two important and frequently overlooked aspects are discussed: the economic 
interactions among the agents that participate in the UFS and the role played by market conditions. 
3.1. Interactions among freight agents  
Carrier behaviour is the interaction amongst the economic agents that produce and ship goods (producers and 
shippers) and those that receive the cargo (receivers). Although other agents are involved, the interactions amongst 
shippers, carriers, and receivers are the most important. Throughout the paper, the “shipper” is assumed to 
comprise both production and shipping functions; while the “carrier” is the agent that conducts the transportation 
activity. The latter includes both common carriers that sell transportation services in the market, and private 
carriers that only serve a parent or related venture. The word “supplier” refers to a super-agent that combines the 
shipping and transportation functions. 
In most cases, carriers are the weakest agents, for economic reasons that originate in the deregulation of the 
trucking industry in most urban markets since the 1980s. Since entry barriers were lowered, the number of entrants 
to the carrier industry dramatically increased, particularly in those segments that use standard trucks without 
specialized equipment. The resulting over-supply puts downward pressure on rates and weakens the position of the 
carriers. The segments that use specialized equipment, e.g., construction trucks, are not similarly affected because 
the higher purchase price acts as a market barrier to potential entrants. 
Shippers and receivers face a different situation. It is significantly more difficult to become a shipper or a 
receiver than it is to become a carrier; the initial investment is much higher. Potential shipper and receiver entrants 
need installations, equipment (and expensive urban land in the case of receivers) as well as the financial resources 
and time required to start operations. Aspiring carriers need only to purchase a truck to be in business. The 
relatively smaller number of shippers and receivers has market power when negotiating with the more numerous 
carriers. There are industry segments in which the carriers have some degree of market power: express deliveries, 
the construction industry, and others. Also, in cities and countries where the urban trucking industry is heavily 
regulated and the market is not perfectly competitive, carriers may have and exert more industry power. However, 
these cases seem to be the exception rather than the rule in urban freight markets.  
Given the imbalance of power among carriers, shippers and receivers, a number of important decisions that are 
generally perceived to be the carriers’ responsibility are heavily influenced—and in some cases, determined—by 
shippers or receivers. Two notable examples are freight mode choice, and the response of carriers to freight road 
pricing. Theory (McFadden, Winston & Boersch-Supan, 1986), empirical evidence (Holguín-Veras, 2002), and 
economic experiments (Holguín-Veras, Xu, de Jong & Maurer, 2011c) have proven that the most important factor 
in freight mode choice is the shipment size (a shipper’s decision). In competitive markets, shippers and receivers 
(which one makes the choice depends on the balance of power between them) are free to select the shipment size 
that minimizes their total logistic costs (Holguín-Veras, Xu, de Jong & Maurer, 2011c; Combes, 2012). Once 
shippers/receivers select shipment size, the carriers decide on the appropriate mode/vehicles; their choice is 
conditioned/determined by the shippers/receivers’ shipment size decision. In terms of carrier response to freight 
road pricing, it has been proven that the receiver is the key decision-maker concerning delivery times (Holguín-
Veras, Silas, Polimeni & Cruz, 2007). The implication is that to understand and influence carrier behaviour, one 
must determine how to affect the behaviour of shippers and receivers. Moreover, these interactions do not take 
place in a vacuum; they are further determined by market conditions. This important topic is discussed next. 
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3.2. The role of market conditions 
The commodity flows transported by freight vehicles are the physical manifestation of economic market 
transactions. The nature of the market and the prevailing regulatory framework play a key role in shaping UFS 
activity. In most cases, city agencies generally take a laissez faire approach, allowing shippers, carriers, and 
receivers to operate the system as they see fit. In other cases, city agencies have pursued regulatory approaches 
that, while implemented to remedy a perceived problem, often do not consider in great detail the market conditions 
that produce the problem. Many of these regulations are not based on any grounded understanding of the best ways 
to induce the desired behaviour change(s). In only a minority of cases are city agency decisions based on solid 
behavioural UFS research.  
The most obvious way the market influences carrier behaviour is by placing constraints on their ability to price. 
One could identify three key market types that differ by the extent of pricing power they allow: monopoly, 
oligopoly, and the competitive market. The vast majority of carriers probably participates in a competitive market; 
followed by oligopolies; with monopolies being the rarest. The optimal prices for these markets are shown below 
(Varian, 1992; Holguín-Veras & Jara-Díaz, 1998). The reader should note that equations (1) and (3) could be 
obtained from (2) by making sk equal to 1 and 0: 
Monopoly:           (1) 
Oligopoly:         (2) 
Competitive market:          (3) 
Where: P is market price, m(Q) is marginal cost, sk is the market share of carrier k, and  is the elasticity. 
These market types differ notably in terms of pricing power. In a monopoly, the carrier could charge a mark-up, 
bounded only by the customer’s willingness to pay (the inverse of the price elasticity); the more inelastic the 
demand, the higher the mark-up above marginal cost. In an oligopoly, the carrier’s ability to price depends on its 
market share and the customer’s willingness to pay. The higher the market share and willingness to pay, the higher 
the mark-up the carrier can extract from the customer. In competitive markets, prices are equal to marginal costs, 
meaning that the carrier does not have power to price. These pricing behaviours have noteworthy implications in 
cost recovery, illustrated below. Note that total costs are equal to the summation of fixed and variable costs: 
          (4) 
The average (ac) and marginal (m) costs are: 
          (5) 
        (6) 
From equation (6), one could obtain: 
          (7) 
Under monopolistic pricing, the carrier could charge above and beyond average costs, garnering significant 
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profits. At the other end of the spectrum, in competitive markets, carriers cannot recover the full costs of the 
operations. To see why, note that equation (5) is the minimum price the supplier must charge to be able to recover 
both fixed and variable costs. Consequently, pricing at marginal cost, as in equation (6), only recovers the variable 
cost of providing the service, as shown in equation (7). This is important because, in conditions of scale 
economies, like those that prevail in most freight markets (where increasing the output Q leads to lower average 
costs), the average cost is higher than marginal cost. Thus, carriers that participate in competitive markets cannot 
recover the fixed costs of their operations, and their assets gradually deteriorate until operations are no longer 
possible and they exit the market. Although one would expect that at some point the number of entrants would 
diminish, leading to a restoration of market power for carriers, there is no evidence of this happening. Becoming a 
trucker is one of the avenues of social ascent for blue collar workers. As a result of the “quasi-infinite” supply of 
carriers, the entrance of others more than compensates for the exit of any one small owner-operator who goes 
bankrupt. In an oligopoly, carriers with a large market share could price above average costs; while those with a 
small market share will find themselves in the same situation as in a competitive market, unable to recover the full 
costs of their operations. 
The behaviour described is not a theoretical aberration; it has been confirmed by empirical evidence. After the 
2001 Port Authority of New York and New Jersey’s Time of Day Pricing Implementation, researchers found that 
only about 11% of the carriers could pass some of the toll costs on to the customers; and the remaining 89% had to 
absorb the toll costs to avoid upsetting their customers (Holguín-Veras, Wang, Xu, Ozbay, Cetin & Polimeni, 
2006). As expected, the carriers who were able to pass on the toll costs were those belonging to industry segments 
with market power, such as carriers of stone/concrete, wood/lumber, food, electronics, and beverages (Holguín-
Veras, 2008). Equally significant, about 70% of carriers cited “customer requirements” as the reason they could 
not change behaviour. In essence, the receivers used their market power to prevent carriers from changing delivery 
times (Holguín-Veras, Wang, Xu, Ozbay, Cetin & Polimeni, 2006).  
4. Lessons Learned 
This section summarizes the chief lessons learned during the off-hour delivery project. 
4.1. Lesson #1: Make sure there is a market failure 
A frequently overlooked but important policy principle is that public sector interventions are only justified 
when a market failure is preventing the economy from reaching its most efficient outcome. Market failures could 
be the result of: productive and allocative inefficiency, monopoly power, missing markets, incomplete markets, de-
merit goods, externalities, lack of property rights, information failure, unstable markets, and inequality (Economics 
Online, 2012). The solution could be technical in nature, such as replacing polluting engines with cleaner ones, or 
could involve either pricing or regulations to ensure that the market failure is removed. A well-designed 
intervention would thus be introduced to lead the system to greater economic efficiency. However, if there is no 
market failure, public sector intervention could make things worse. Referred to in the literature as a “government 
failure,” the inefficiency is introduced by the public sector decision (in contrast to a “market failure” produced by 
market forces).  
In urban areas there are numerous situations involving freight activity, pedestrians, bicyclists, and communities 
that are market failures, typically relating to externalities produced by freight activity. When deciding how to 
address the problem, city agencies must carefully consider the potential impacts of the solution, as government 
failures are a decided risk. For instance, banning large trucks in congested areas—though beneficial for the area 
within the ban—could produce congestion and externalities in the regional networks as carriers have to use many 
small trucks to transport the same cargo that their large trucks once did (Qureshi, Taniguchi & Yamada, 2012; 
Holguín-Veras, Cruz & Ban, 2013a) (After such a ban in Sao Paulo, Brazil, a large company reported to the first 
author using 2.7 small trucks for each of the large trucks banned). Time-access restrictions for all trucks have been 
found to increase both carrier costs and freight traffic externalities (Quak & de Koster, 2009). In both cases, a 
government failure is likely for the simple reason that the private goal (minimization of private costs) is in 
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agreement with the social goal of minimizing truck travel in the networks. As a result, the imposition of large truck 
bans, or time access restrictions, could increase both private costs and externalities. 
Establishing whether a market failure really exists requires: (1) proving that the most efficient outcome for the 
economy has not been reached; and (2) identifying the actual factor creating the failure (Holguín-Veras, 2011). 
Once the existence of a market failure has been established, the next step is to determine the most effective 
mechanism for its removal. In deciding how best to proceed, policy makers need to consider the implementation 
costs of the correction procedures. If the benefit of removing the market failure, either by pricing or regulation, is 
smaller than the corresponding incremental cost (including implementation costs) then it is better to remain with 
the status quo. For instance, a zero tolerance policy against parking violations may require large enforcement 
expenses, which may not be compensated for by the benefits in congestion reduction. In such a case, the zero-
tolerance policy does not make economic sense.  
In the OHD project, the first step was to find out if OHD is indeed the most efficient outcome for the economy. 
Using traffic simulations and the transportation planning model, different scenarios were tested. The results 
showed that the status quo (4-5% of OHD) is indeed suboptimal; the optimal participation level was estimated to 
be in the range of 14-21% (staffed OHD) (Holguín-Veras, Ozbay, Komhauser, Brom, Iyer, Yushimito et al., 
2011b), and over 40% for unassisted OHD (Holguín-Veras, Marquis & Brom, 2012). These modalities differ in the 
costs to receivers. These results are consistent with Yannis, Golias & Antoniou (2006).  
4.2. Lesson #2: Listen to and engage stakeholders in the solution of problems 
To solve a problem that has been identified as a market failure, it is vital to engage and listen to the key 
stakeholders. Proper, honest engagement brings multiple benefits, as it: (1) may lead to confirmation or rejection of 
the hypothesis that there is a problem to be solved, or mitigated, by public sector intervention; (2) will provide the 
public sector with a thorough idea of the constraints and expectations of the various stakeholders; and, (3) will 
enable the public sector to chart implementation paths that have a better chance of succeeding. Developing and 
sustaining successful outreach is the core of such a process, and integral to creating a solid relation between the 
public and private sectors. If researchers and public agencies spend time to build relations with the private sector, 
to establish a minimum level of trust, and to clearly articulate why private sector input is needed to help shape 
public policy, their chances of success will increase. 
Both public and private sectors need to feel that their points of views are being heard, and taken into account. 
When the public sector solicits the private sector’s input and assistance to solve UFS problems, it is important that 
the public sector also collaborates with them to solve problems of particular interest to the industry. The public 
sector’s willingness to change or modify a course in response to input from the private sector could foster a 
collaborative environment; as would the private sector’s willingness to modify operations in response to public 
sector input. This back-and-forth collaborative environment can forge stronger policies.  
It is always a challenge to secure the honest and timely feedback that the public sector needs to really 
understand private sector constraints and expectations. These tips may help: 
 
1) Try to get input from as many independent sources as possible. In doing so, the authors found the operator’ 
perspectives to be particularly insightful. However, since operators are busy running their businesses, they often 
cannot commit much time to speaking to policymakers and planners. 
2) Be mindful that the positions expressed are likely to represent only a portion of the industry. This applies 
to both individual company spokespersons and leaders of trade groups. Even trade group leaders reflect the 
positions of their members, not necessarily those of the rest of the industry or of non-members. These trade 
group leaders are relatively easy to speak with, since interfacing with the public sector is part of their job. 
However, this ease may in turn lead to biased input and policy decisions, unless the public sector is more 
thorough and inclusive in their outreach. 
 
A healthy outreach process leads to a public sector that is well informed of the concerns, expectations, and 
constraints of the private sector. This, in turn, enhances transportation policy makers’ ability to implement change, 
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change that achieves the intended objectives with minimal political costs. Such an outreach process is critical to 
understanding the profound interconnectedness of the UFS. Modifying the functioning of one node in this 
interconnected web is likely to have repercussions in all of the others. Sound decision-making requires an 
understanding of these effects; any shortcuts in the process will likely lead to more difficulties at the 
implementation stage.  
These are recommendations for establishing a robust outreach process: 
1) Designate one person at the key city agencies as the point of contact, and with the authority, to deal with 
freight issues. The designation of such a “freight person” is a highly recommended first step that will likely 
have a significant impact. Over time, that person will gain a deep understanding of the functioning of the UFS, 
get to know the key individuals in the business, and develop a network of contacts that could prove useful 
throughout the process. Equally important, the industry’s varied agents will know whom to contact for 
information, a welcome advantage when trying to navigate complex institutional environments.  
2) Create an Industry Advisory Group (IAG). An IAG is designed to be a forum for the discussion of UFS 
issues that meets several times a year, or when the need arises. The IAG could provide city agencies with vital 
industry feedback on key issues, and on policies and programs that the city agencies want to pursue. However, 
it is important to ensure that the IAG reflects the overall composition of the industry. Shippers, carriers, and 
receivers of the key industry sectors, both small and large, should be involved to provide city agencies with a 
solid idea about the issues, needs, and expectations of the entire UFS community.  
3) Complement IAG input with targeted outreach efforts. Since it is unlikely that many business owners or 
managers could participate in the IAG in a sustained fashion (typically, the majority of attendees of IAG 
meetings are trade group representatives) it is important to complement the input received. Some suggestions 
are to: (1) ask the trade groups to disseminate short articles about city initiatives of concern to their members; 
(2) attend trade group meetings and conferences; and (3) arrange for meetings with key companies to gather 
input directly. 
The recommendations outlined here greatly benefitted the OHD project. The creation of the NYCDOT’s Freight 
Office in 2008 was a turning point in relations with the private sector. For the first time in the NYCDOT’s history, 
a team of professionals was charged with improving the efficiency of UFS operations. By working together 
towards the solution of problems, relations with the private sector dramatically improved. The OHD also created 
an IAG which has as its members some of the industry’s most influential companies and trade groups such as the 
Manhattan Chamber of Commerce. The IAG has played a key role in disseminating project information, and 
recruiting participants. Input from the IAG, complemented with the dozens of IDIs conducted, provided the team 
with a thorough idea of how best to implement the project. 
4.3. Lesson #3: Follow the science 
As previously stated, the behaviour of the multitude of participants in the UFS are far from fully understood. 
The profound heterogeneity in the UFS adds complexity; different businesses in the same industry sector can react 
very differently to the same public sector policy. Freight behaviour research therefore plays an important role in 
informing public sector decision-making. The IAG is an obvious place to garner behaviour insight, though more 
detailed information is needed to draw firm conclusions about the worthiness of a given policy or program. 
Typically, a large portion of the research effort is spent trying to understand the behaviour that creates the 
problem itself. This entails various forms of qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques, including: 
1) In-Depth Interviews (IDIs). An important outreach mechanism, IDIs enable extended discussions with key 
individuals. Typically one hour in duration, IDIs provide a great opportunity to gather insight, probe for 
additional information, and dynamically change the direction of the discussion, as demanded by the 
circumstances. IDIs are an ideal mechanism to gain insight from industry leaders, decision makers, and leading 
researchers. To maximize the usefulness of the IDI it is advisable to: (1) define interview goals and objectives; 
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(2) draft an interview script to ensure that all the key topics are discussed; (3) pilot test the script, making 
changes as appropriate; (4) identify the various stakeholder groups, and the list of individuals considered for 
IDIs; and (5) analyse the results. 
2) Focus groups. This is an interesting form of qualitative research in which a group of individuals are asked to 
respond to a given policy question with the assistance of a moderator, who probes different aspects of the 
subject. In contrast to IDIs, focus groups emphasize the collective discussion of a complex subject, where the 
moderator steers the discussion in directions likely to reveal important insights. Typically, the participants 
receive compensation for their participation, and the focus group takes place at a special location. Videotaping 
of the discussions and observations from a one-way mirror is common. Selectivity bias can be a concern with 
focus groups because only the opinions of those who participate are captured.  
3) Behavioural surveys combined with discrete choice modelling. The previous techniques are qualitative in 
nature, but behavioural surveys intend to produce quantitative estimates of how the UFS would respond to a 
given policy or program. The heart of the approach is a survey that attempts to capture how specific agents 
would respond. If the survey focuses on actual behaviour it is a revealed preference; if it focuses on 
hypothetical scenarios it is referred to as stated preference. Although significant insight can be gained by 
descriptive analyses of the data, when the data is used to estimate behavioural models (typically discrete choice 
models) the analyses are greatly enhanced. Among other benefits, the models identify the interactions among 
independent variables, and could be used to estimate market shares for the population at large. Moreover they 
have behavioural interpretation, and their parameters can be statistically tested. 
With these forms of information/data gathering, city agencies can gain a solid understanding of how issues are 
perceived by the various participants in the UFS, as well as their opinions about city-led policies and programs. 
Once the outreach process is completed, the next step is to act on the insight gained. The input received could be 
very negative. If so, the city agencies have three alternatives: (1) disregard the input received, and continue with 
the original idea; (2) modify the original idea to make it more acceptable and ease its implementation; or (3) 
abandon the idea altogether. Disregarding the input received could be the best solution in cases where the quality 
of the input is suspect or biased, or deemed unworthy of consideration. However, doing so could also lead to 
serious political challenges. Modifying the original idea may speed up implementation, though at the cost of some 
provisions. In cases where the original plan cannot be salvaged, it may be best to simply abandon it. Deciding on 
the wisest course of action is always a difficult judgment call. However, what is clear to the authors is that any of 
these outcomes is preferable to trying to implement a policy or program without soliciting any sort of input from 
the companies that would be impacted. In such a case, the opposition of the private sector is likely to be much 
stiffer than if they had been consulted.  
The behavioural research compiled, using the various forms of outreach discussed in this section, proved 
invaluable for the OHD project.  The research produced estimates of the number of deliveries attracted by the 
different industry sectors (Holguín-Veras, Jaller, Destro, Ban, Lawson & Levinson, 2011a), and a sense of which 
sectors were the most inclined to participate (Holguín-Veras, Silas, Polimeni & Cruz, 2007; Holguín-Veras, Silas, 
Polimeni & Cruz, 2008).  The team concluded that the food and retail sectors, given the large number of deliveries 
they produce, were most likely to participate in OHD. Ironically, the prevailing assumption at the time was that 
these sectors were opposed to OHD. Further behavioural research revealed factors that could foster their 
participation: a one-time-incentive, discounts from vendors for OHD, public recognition, business support services, 
and the availability of a trusted vendor (Holguín-Veras, Wang, Hodge, Sánchez-Díaz, Campbell, Rothbard et al., 
2013b). These insights have been used to design a multi-prong strategy to foster participation: the public sector 
offers the one-time-incentive and public recognition; vendors offer discounts for goods delivered during the off-
hours; and the trucking associations provide a trusted vendor certification program. 
4.4. Lesson #4: Pilot tests could be a good idea’s best friend, or worst enemy  
The off-hour delivery pilot test clearly showed how powerful a well-designed pilot test could be. The research 
previously conducted for the project identified the financial incentives required to produce a shift to off-hours, and 
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the ideal target groups. The pilot tests—which started after careful selection of participants and coordination with 
all stakeholders—took place during October-December 2009. Three separate groups of companies (25 receivers, 8 
vendors) conducted OHD for a month. Their operations were carefully monitored, and GPS devices were used to 
track the performance of the participating vehicles.  
The pilot test results, and the award ceremony organized by NYCDOT to honour the companies that  
participated, caught the attention of the popular media, and numerous articles were published about the project, 
lauding it as a business-friendly sustainability policy (Journal of Commerce, 2010; Wall Street Journal, 2010). This 
in turn, provided decision-makers with a potent stimulus to push for implementation; and helped publicise the 
concept among the private sector. A theoretically sound idea thus received crucial confirmation through a well-
designed pilot test. 
Other benefits of a well-designed pilot test include: (1) it provides a real-life test of a new idea or program; (2) 
it is an excellent way to identify problems that need to be ironed out before full-scale implementation; (3) it 
develops new, unexpected insights into overlooked aspects of the concept being tested; and, (4) it can be a great 
mechanism to attract attention and support from both public sector decision-makers and the private sector. All of 
these benefits are derived from the fact that a pilot test is perceived as “real-life” while research is “theoretical.” 
However, a pilot test can fulfil such expectations only if it is adequately designed. A poorly designed pilot could 
damage the reputation of a new concept, and its proponents, considerably. This is illustrated with a matrix, below, 
that shows as rows the intrinsic value of an idea or program, and as columns its performance under the pilot test. 
For simplicity, the corresponding alternatives are classified as “good” or “bad.” Table 1 shows the potential 
outcomes for both a well-designed pilot test in pane (a), and a poorly designed one in pane (b). 
Table 1. Potential outcomes of a pilot test 
 
 
Pane (a) shows that a good idea tested with a well-designed pilot test is likely to do well; and a bad idea is not 
likely to perform well. In this situation, the pilot has a high discriminating value as it does not lead to errors in its 
assessment of the idea’s worthiness. The case in pane (b) represents a poorly designed pilot test, where there are 
non-zero probabilities E1 and E2 of the pilot reaching an incorrect conclusion. This could lead to false positives (a 
bad idea that is deemed worthy) and false negatives (a good idea incorrectly classified as bad).  
The implications of these errors are not the same. In the case of a false positive, a bad idea may find its way to 
implementation, which could lead to wasted resources and effort. At some future point, it is likely that someone 
will reconsider the decision. In the case of a false negative, a good idea would not have a chance of being 
implemented. Moreover, this erroneous conclusion may deter practitioners and researchers from ever considering 
the idea as it may be difficult for researchers to take up a subject that has previously been found unworthy of 
further consideration. 
5. Transferability Questions (or Issues) 
Growing interest in the scope for the transferability of urban freight initiatives makes it relevant to consider 
whether the New York studies can be of value in other cities.  A wide review is beyond the scope of the current 
paper. However it has been possible to consider the case of London and to reflect on whether the lessons learnt in 
New York have a broader applicability. Table 2 summarizes the operation of the off hours delivery trials in 
London in early 2012 as the city prepared to host the Olympic Games. In comparison with the New York 
experience it is clear that these initiatives: 
(a) Well designed pilot test (b) Poorly designed pilot test
Good idea Bad idea Good idea Bad idea
Good 100% Good 100%-E E
Bad 100% Bad E 100%-EI
de
a
Id
ea
Pilot test conclusion: Pilot test conclusion:
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x Covered a wide range of commodity types (and thus the transport operation were also diverse); 
x Were mostly small-scale and short-term; 
x Provided useful action research about the issues and problems; 
x Lacked rigorous monitoring and extensive data collection. 
   Table 2. Night-time deliveries in London - preparing for the 2012 Olympic Games 
Rationale for trials: 
The road restrictions required during the 2012 Olympic Games in London were as likely to create some 
difficulties for freight deliveries. The restrictions required that delivery activity took place outside normal 
operating hours, and in the most affected locations, deliveries were only possible between midnight and 
06:00. The expected increase in night-time delivery work resulted in the need for Transport for London 
(TfL), London’s local authorities, businesses and operators to focus attention on how to facilitate this level 
of activity with minimum disruption to local residents. 
 
Developing a code of practice 
TfL developed a code of practice in partnership with the Freight Transport Association and the Noise 
Abatement Society that provided guidance for how best to minimize noise disturbance when carrying out 
night-time deliveries (Transport for London, 2012a). The code is relevant to all sectors receiving and 
making deliveries and consists of three parts: (i) general guidance about what to consider, (ii) measures to 
reduce noise at the delivery point, and (iii) measures for drivers. Measures included in the code include 
consideration of: the use of newer, quieter delivery vehicles and equipment, behavioural changes to reduce 
noise (especially in relation to goods vehicle drivers and receiving staff at the site), and staff training both in 
the receiving business as well as in supplier companies and logistics providers. 
 
The trials (pilot projects) 
TfL carried out the trials in London in conjunction with businesses, freight operators and local authorities to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the code of practice. These trials included a variety of sectors including 
retail, hotels, bars, restaurants, drinks suppliers, and waste collectors. The trials were written-up and made 
available as case studies (Transport for London, 2012b). In each of the trials, a working group was 
established which comprised relevant staff from the businesses involved, their logistics providers, and 
Environmental Health Officers from the local authority. Each of the businesses participating in these trials 
altered their delivery schedules, choosing delivery times between 22:00 and 06:00. All staff from the 
business and their suppliers who were involved in the trial received training so that they could follow the 
code of practice. Before each trial began, TfL carried out an audit of the point of delivery to identify 
potential noise sources associated with delivery and unloading activity. The local authority also carried out 
on-site auditing during the trial to monitor the behaviour of drivers and staff receiving deliveries, and to 
check that the code of practice was being followed. Noise monitoring equipment was installed for the trial 
period so that any incidents resulting in complaints from residents could be analysed. The trial period during 
which the delivery times were changed and the code of practice followed ranged from one to four weeks in 
most cases. The noise monitoring results were not published in the case studies. No complaints were 
received from residents during the trials. The trials were used as the basis for more extended off hours 
deliveries during the 2012 Games period. The results of these more extended operations are the subject of 
on-going discussion although no central monitoring and data collection was carried out.  
 
Source: Lammgard and Browne (2012) 
 
Despite these differences it is also clear from the pilot work that the fundamental tenets developed from the 
research in New York can be seen to apply in London. Thus it is possible to confirm the importance of: 
understanding behaviour (i.e. it is not simply a matter of technology and regulations); working closely with 
stakeholders (in London the cooperation of relevant local boroughs was important). In New York it was also clear 
that the economic conditions involved and the role of market forces was a critical element within the development 
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of the off-hour delivery initiatives. However, in London the importance of market forces has not been fully 
explored. There had been a number of discussions over the years about the opportunity for off-hour deliveries in 
London with a few trials being completed. The increased pressure on road capacity and loading space, arising from 
changes to loading times on the main road network during the Olympics, provided the impetus for the trials in 
2012. The full analysis of costs and benefits has not been carried out. 
Four of the lessons learned in New York have been discussed in an earlier Section of the paper: 
x Make sure there is a market failure; 
x Listen to and engage stakeholders in the solution of problems; 
x Follow the Science; 
x Pilot tests could be a good idea’s best friend, or worst enemy; 
In the London context it can be seen that these lessons are relevant but the issue is complicated. As noted above 
the renewed willingness to try off-hours delivery was triggered by an external event and not by a comprehensive 
analysis of market failure. The importance of stakeholder engagement was certainly as important in London as in 
New York. The New York experience of following the science has been partially achieved in London where the 
trials are now being reviewed to see what further lessons can be learned but it could be argued that more 
monitoring and data collection could have been done and that this was a missed opportunity. The value of pilot 
tests together with the inherent potential risk is also a lesson that can be seen in London. Some of the off hours 
deliveries did result in complaints about noise. However, the evidence in London suggests that pilot tests are a 
good way to explore the possibilities and to see what can be achieved and overall the initiatives taken can be 
considered successful. 
6. Conclusions 
The complexity of the urban freight system (UFS) cannot be underestimated: a highly interconnected web of 
economic agents conducting activities that produce multiple impacts—positive and negative—on economic 
competitiveness, quality of life, sustainability, and environmental justice. Such complexity, and the real possibility 
that public sector interventions could have unintended negative consequences, clearly suggests that city agencies 
must proceed carefully but firmly to address UFS problems. Market failures that lead to economic inefficiencies, 
and their contributing factors, must be well understood before workable solutions can be developed. Stakeholder 
outreach and research is essential to identify the best solutions to the problems identified. Understanding the 
system, and gaining insight into how the agents involved would react to a policy or program will help city agencies 
chart effective courses of action. The paper identifies pilot tests as very useful tools that, because of their “real-
life” applications and connotations, help to eliminate from consideration programs that are unworkable, and to 
garner support for good programs. To provide the full measure of their potential benefits pilot tests, must be 
properly designed with the backing of solid research; otherwise they can lead to erroneous conclusions that could 
discredit a good idea, or allow a bad idea to be implemented.  
Taken together, these conclusions highlight the complexity of the UFS, and the need to understand its 
functioning well in order to move it towards greater sustainability. Ironically, the factors that give the UFS its 
complexity (the multiplicity of agents and impacts) also make it an important subject of practice and research.  The 
central question of the Off Hour Delivery Program was how to engage all involved in a constructive, multi-
stakeholder problem-solving approach; this difficult goal remains the ‘Holy Grail’ of urban freight policy.  
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